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Non-technical Summary
We analyze wage developments in the East German transition process both at
the macro and at the microeconomic level. At the macroeconomic level, we
draw special attention to the important distinction between product and
consumption wages, describe the development of various wage measures, labor
productivity and unit labor costs in East Germany in relation to West Germany,
and relate these developments to the system of collective wage bargaining.  At
the microeconomic level, we describe changes in the distribution of hourly
wages between 1990 and 1997 and analyze the economic factors determining
these changes by way of empirical wage functions estimated on the basis of the
Socio–Economic Panel for East Germany. The paper also draws some
conclusions on the likely future course of the East-West German wage
convergence process.
Nominal wages in East Germany increased dramatically in the first years after
unification, which had very different effects on labor costs on the one hand, and
the standard of living of East Germans on the other.  Unit labor costs sky-
rocketed at the beginning of the transition process and have since come down
only slightly still exceeding the West German level still by a wide margin.  This
resulted in a dramatic decline of employment and extremely high unemployment
rates in East Germany, which implies that observed productivity increases do
not represent real productivity gains in the East German economy and can
therefore not be distributed to workers without causing excessive
unemployment.
While East German wages increased substantially throughout the wage
distribution, there was also a pronounced increase in wage inequality. The upper
ranks of the wage distribution saw the highest increases in real wages although
there were also marked improvements for the lower ranks. By 1997, overall
wage inequality for East German men has reached roughly the same level as in
West Germany, while female wages in East Germany are distributed much more
unequally than in West Germany now.
The pronounced upward-shift of the female wage-experience profile in the
public sector together with the substantial increase of the share of women
working in this sector is an important factor for the observed gender differences
in the development of the East German wage distribution after unification.  To a
large extent, this also explains the fact that the still existing wage differential
between East and West Germany has become much smaller for women than for
men.  However, it seems unlikely that the very large share of women working in
the public sector, often employed on heavily subsidized public works programs,
is sustainable in the future.  In the private sector of the East German economy it
will still take a long time before wages have reached West German levels.
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11 Introduction
The excessive increase of East German wages is seen by many observers as the main
culprit for the dramatic employment decline and the unprecedented increase in
unemployment in the transition process to a market economy (see, e.g., Sinn and
Sinn, 1992; Siebert, 1993).  Soon at the beginning of the transition process, in most
industries collectively bargained wages were set to reach parity with West German
levels in 1994.  Actual wage settlements were not related to economic conditions and
productivity developments, but simply were set to catch–up to this pre–specified
target. The resulting employment losses were either viewed as inevitable by those
who saw the future of the East German economy in a high productivity, high wage
strategy or not related to wages at all, a view held publicly by West German union
leaders who, at least in the beginning, dominated the collective bargaining process.
Another important argument for a quick catch–up of eastern wages, popular among
politicians and union leaders alike, was that otherwise East Germans would migrate to
the west at a grand scale and congest already crowded labor and housing markets.
However, with sky–rocketing unemployment and the virtual breakdown of
manufacturing industries the full adjustment of East German contract wages to West
German levels has been postponed.  Even at the end of this century, wages in most
East German industries are still considerably lower than in West Germany.
At least as important as the issue of the catching–up of East German wages at the
aggregate level is the question whether wages are sufficiently differentiated by
qualification, industry, and region to account for differences in productivity levels in
East Germany.  Conventional wisdom holds that, due to socialist ideology, there was
little wage differentiation in the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), and that
the development to a market economy necessitates profound changes in the wage
structure corresponding to changes in the relative demand for skills brought about by
the restructuring process in the East German economy.  It is also conventional
wisdom that collective bargaining agreements have not allowed for this necessary
adjustment of wages.
However, an important factor often overlooked in debates on wage flexibility in the
East German economy is that centralized wage contracts were often not enforceable
at the firm level and wages might well be more sensitive to economic conditions of
single firms in the present East German situation than it has usually been the case
under "normal" circumstances in Western Germany.  This new development in
German industrial relations include concession bargaining at the firm level and the
fact that incumbent firms have been leaving or new firms have not been joining
employers' unions at an unprecedented scale.  Facing these developments and ever
rising unemployment the collective bargaining parties in the end agreed to allow
effective wages at the firm level to be set below the contract wage under certain
2circumstances specified in special "emergency" provisions known as
"Öffnungsklauseln". Therefore, it seems not obvious a priori that the wage structure
in East Germany is in fact as rigid as often described in the literature and to what
extent collective bargaining agreements have affected the East German wage structure
at the microeconomic level.
Due to new production processes and profound changes in the organization of work,
we would expect that the value of human capital acquired under socialism has
depreciated in the transition process to a market economy.  This conjecture, in fact,
seems to be supported by empirical evidence, especially with respect to the
depreciation of general labor market experience accumulated under socialism
(Krueger and Pischke, 1992; Bird, Schwarze and Wagner, 1994, Steiner and Puhani,
1997, Steiner and Wagner, 1997). On the other hand, there is some evidence (Hunt
1999a) that especially at the beginning of the transition process the economic returns
to job mobility were quite high for the more motivated and better qualified workers.
Given the great importance of general and firm-specific work experience for wage
determination, these adjustments of the human capital stock have important
implications for the speed of East-West German wage convergence (Burda and
Schmidt, 1997, Steiner and Wagner, 1997) as well as changes in labor force
participation and the development of household incomes in East Germany (Hauser
and Fabig, 1999).
In this paper, the importance of the above–mentioned factors for the development
and the structure of wages in East Germany is explored both at the macro and at the
microeconomic level. At the macroeconomic level, we draw special attention to the
important distinction between product and consumption wages, describe the
development of various wage measures, labor productivity and unit labor costs in
East Germany in relation to West Germany (section 2), and relate these developments
to the system of collective wage bargaining (section 3).  At the microeconomic level,
we analyze the development of the distribution of hourly wages between 1990 and
1997 on the basis of the German Socio–Economic Panel for East Germany (section
4). In section 5, we relate the observed changes in the wage distribution to the
underlying economic factors, in particular human capital acquired through formal
vocational education as well as general and firm-specific work experience.  The
results from empirical wage functions specified on the basis of the economic
hypotheses derived in section 5 and estimated on cross section data for the years
1990, 1992, 1995 and 1997 are discussed in section 6.  In the concluding section we
summarize our main results and draw some conclusions.
32 Macroeconomic Developments – Some Basic Facts
As a prerequisite for an informed discussion of the development of aggregate wages
in East Germany some basic facts are to be outlined very briefly.
Table 1: Development of wages in East Germany 1990-1998 a)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
gross nominal wagesb) 9.78 14.25 17.65 18.64 19.64 21.24 21.91 22.35 22.39
product wagesc) 11.33 19.11 21.01 21.62 22.09 23.56 24.10 24.55 24.60
consumption wagesd) 8.73 10.41 10.47 10.61 10.57 11.07 11.46 11.35 11.32
productivity growthe) –1.4 5.9 12.7 7.6 8.7 6.1 4.0 5.6 1.8
unit labor costs f) 24.0 52.7 12.3 2.6 –0.4 1.5 –0.7 –2.7 –2.0
Notes:
a) annual averages
b) gross labor income divided by man-hours, in DM
c) gross labor income including employers contributions to social security divided by man-hours and
deflated by the index of product prices (1991=100), in DM
d) net labor income divided by man-hours and deflated by the consumer price index (1991=100), in DM
e) productivity: real GDP divided by man-hours (in percent)
f) unit labor costs: gross labor income including employers contributions to social security divided by real
GDP (growth rates in percent)
Source: Franz (1999), p. 383.
To begin with, Table 1 displays the time pattern of various types of labor
remuneration. The development of the product wage and the consumption wage are
particularly interesting: while the product wage more than doubled between 1990 and
1998, the increase in the consumption wage amounts to some 30 percent during this
period, with even a slight degrease since 1996. Put differently, the consumption wage
in 1998 equals the product wage in 1990. The widening gap between these two wage
measures is caused by the higher inflation rate of consumer prices in East Germany in
the beginning of the nineties as well as by an increasing tax wedge (similar to the
situation in West Germany).  The slow increase of consumption wages relative to
product wages may explain the disputes over “fair wage developments” in East
Germany. Equally important is the development of unit labor costs. Within the first
three years after the fall of the iron curtain, unit labor costs skyrocketed by nearly 90
percent. More dramatically, in 1992 gross wages in East Germany were roughly
comparable to the respective level in the U.S. with productivity levels in East
Germany in the order of magnitude of those in Mexico (Siebert, 1993, p.128).
4The latter observation calls for a brief comparison of various labor market indicators
between East and West Germany, as highlighted in Table 2.  As to gross nominal
wages, the East-West wage differential amounted to more than one half in 1991.  This
gap decreased to about one third by the mid-nineties and has remained fairly stable at
that level since then. The increase in East German labor productivity of about one
third to about 60 percent of the West German level is, of course, remarkable.
However, it has to be stressed that part of this catching-up is due to the reduction in
employment, which by itself causes higher productivity levels. Indeed, the decline in
East German employment was tremendous: the number of employed  persons
(excluding self-employed people) fell from about 7 million persons in 1991 to around
5.5 million in 1999, i.e., by more than 20 percent. During the same time the respective
decline in West Germany was around 5 percent.
Collective bargaining agreements in East and West Germany typically do not take
into account that an increase in productivity due to dismissals does not represent real
productivity gains stemming from, say, improved production techniques or
investment in human capital. For example, the Council of Economic Experts
(Sachverständigenrat 1997, p. 266) estimated a difference of 0.5 percentage points
between the conventionally measured productivity increase in West Germany in 1997
and the respective number corrected for employment declines and another 0.9
percentage points for converting the increase in average labor productivity into the
rise in marginal labor productivity at normal employment, the latter figure representing
a guideline for wage setting in a situation of normal employment.  Although these
calculations cannot be transferred directly to East Germany, they give an impression
of how substantial East German productivity would have to be adjusted in order to
obtain true productivity gains there. The same caveat holds for the comparison of
unit labor costs.
Finally, the last row in table 2 displays the ratio of official plus hidden unemployment
in East Germany in comparison with West Germany. Hidden unemployment
consists, for example, of people who are in active labor market policy programs or in
a pre-retirement schemes but would be registered as unemployed persons otherwise.
Especially for East Germany hidden unemployment is tremendous: in 1998 registered
unemployment amounted to around 1.4 million persons and hidden unemployment to
0.9 million people (the corresponding figures for West Germany are 2.9 and 1.0
million persons, respectively).
5Table 2: East-West German comparison of basic labor market indicators a)
1991 1992 1994 1996 1998
gross nominal wages b) 46.7 60.7 70.5 73.6 73.9
labor productivity c) 31.0 43.5 56.0 59.4 59.4
unit labor costs d) 150.6 139.4 126.0 124.0 124.1
unemployment rates e) 391.1 457.0 274.6 213.8 220.2
Notes:
a) ratios of East German to West German figures multiplied by 100; see text for explanations
b) gross labor income per employee
c) nominal GDP per employee
d) domestic gross labor income per employee divided by labor productivity
e) registered and hidden unemployment, for definition see text.
Source: Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Wochenbericht 17/99, p. 31 (wages,
productivity, unit labor costs); Sachverständigenrat, Jahresgutachten, various issues (for unemployment);
calculations by the authors.
3 The Role of Collective Bargaining in Wage Formation
The exorbitant catching-up process of East German wages to West German levels,
not justified by equivalent true productivity growth, had its impact on the actual
operation of labor market institutions. In the beginning of the transformation process,
the bargaining process was a one–sided game. The employer side was not adequately
represented at the collective bargaining table since it was represented by either former
managers of state owned firms or by representatives of West German firms who had
little incentive to fight for low wages in East German firms, their prospective
competitors in national and international markets. On the other hand, the old trade
union, the Freie Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund, was discredited by its collaborative
behavior under the old regime. Consequently, its West German counterpart, the
"Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund", which acts as the umbrella organization for sixteen
constituent industrial unions, was able to move into this virgin territory and organize
workers with impressive ease. It was recognized by East German employers as the
de facto negotiating partner in collective bargaining and was thereby able to conclude
wage agreements in almost every industrial sector, in the public sector and some of
the service industries.  Another important role has been played by the
Treuhandanstalt, the public agency in charge of privatising state–owned firms, which
had to deal with political pressure to financially support large industrial enterprises,
especially in the manufacturing sector (to save the "industrial core" of East
Germany).  This has probably also led to relatively high wage increases, especially in
the manufacturing sector.
6As is well known, wage bargaining in Germany takes place at the (regional) industry
level. The outcome of those wage settlements concern, strictly speaking, only union
members in firms which belong to the respective (regional) employers association. In
order to circumvent negotiated wage increases, unacceptable for the firm for eco-
nomic reasons, the firm has, in principle, two options on legal grounds (see
Fitzenberger and Franz 1999 for details).  First, the firm is free to make other wage
contracts with non-unionized employees (but union membership must not serve as a
selection criterion for different wage contracts) even if it belongs to the employers
association. This is not done frequently. Besides avoiding internal disputes, the major
reason is that the worker presumable would join the union (union deterrence effect).
Second, the firm can choose to leave the employers association. But in this case the
firm is committed to the negotiated wage rate until the collective agreement expires.
But even afterwards or if the firm does not join the employers association at all, a
legal restriction (§77,3 law on labor relations in the firm, ”Betriebsver-
fassungsgesetz”) prohibits employers from making a wage contract with their works
council (but not with the individual worker) which undercuts a negotiated wage
settlement unless this wage settlement explicitly gives room for such firm specific
contracts which is rarely the case.
Taken together, there are severe constraints for wages being flexible enough to meet
economic requirement at the firm level, let alone to correct the catching–up process
of wages in general. The result of these restrictions with respect to the operating of
wage bargaining institutions is displayed in Table 3.
To begin with, in East Germany only one half of all employees and one quarter of all
firms are covered by industry-level wage bargaining whereas the figures for West
Germany are considerably higher namely two third and nearly one half, respectively.
These numbers correspond to the greater relevance of firm-level and employee-level
wage bargaining in East Germany. More specifically, industry-level wage bargaining
takes place primarily in certain sectors such as banks, insurance, public sector,
mining, energy and construction, and in large firms. Taken together, in East Germany
industry-level wage bargaining is loosing grounds on a large scale.
Even more interesting is the erosion of industry-level wage contracts by breach of the
contract. For example, in the manufacturing sector of East Germany around 14
percent of all firms which are covered by negotiated wages undercut negotiated
wages (with a more or less tacid agreement by the works council).1  These firms had,
strictly speaking, to commit a breach of the collective wage contract in order to
ensure their economic survival.
                                       
1 See Scheremet (1995), table 2; the figure in this source refers to 1994, but is similar to that in 1998
according to still unpublished investigations.
7Table 3: Level of wage bargaining in Germany by sector and firm size a)
Sector/Firm Size Industry Level Firm Level Employee Level
East West East West East West
sector b)
mining, energy 87.3 76.4 7.9 21.6 4.8 2.0
basic materials 48.8 75.2 9.4 8.0 41.8 16.8
investment goods 40.0 74.0 10.8 5.9 49.2 20.2
consumption goods 38.2 75.9 15.3 7.2 46.5 16.9
construction 50.3 83.0 11.8 3.5 37.9 13.5
trade 40.7 64.6 8.8 7.1 50.5 28.2
transportation 39.3 52.5 34.8 24.0 26.0 23.5
banks/insurance 90.0 85.5 4.5 6.1 5.5 8.4
public sector 90.0 88.7 8.7 8.1 1.2 3.2
total 50.5 67.8 12.7 8.0 36.8 24.2
firm size c)
1 – 4 employees 17.4 34.5 5.0 4.1 77.6 61.4
5 - 9 24.5 49.0 8.4 5.1 67.0 46.0
10 - 19 34.0 61.5 10.3 3.6 55.6 34.9
20 - 49 44.7 65.8 10.9 7.1 44.4 27.2
50 - 99 56.7 67.6 13.4 6.8 29.9 25.6
100 - 199 60.9 76.4 18.0 8.1 21.1 15.6
200 - 499 65.9 72.9 17.9 12.2 16.2 14.9
500 - 999 80.7 83.9 13.9 10.1 5.4 6.0
1000 and more 81.5 79.1 14.0 14.4 4.5 6.5
total 25.8 47.7 7.6 4.8 66.6 47.5
Notes:
a) Figures are based on individual firm data (IAB-Betriebspanel) with at least one employee subject to
social security contributions and are then estimated for the aggregates. Data refer to the year 1998.
b) sector: percentage of employees covered by industry/firm/employee-level wage bargaining,
respectively, not all sectors included.
c) firm size: percentage of firms with numbers of employees covered by industry/firm/employee-level
wage bargaining.
Source:  Kohaut and Schnabel (1999).
84 Changes in the East German Wage Distribution 1990 - 1997
Having described the main trends in the development of aggregate wages in East
Germany, we now turn to the analysis of changes in the East German wage
distribution.  In particular, we analyze the development of hourly wages between
1990 and 1997 on the basis of the German  Socio–Economic Panel for East
Germany (GSOEP–East). Since the first wave of the GSOEP–East refers to the
period immediately before German monetary union in July 1990, it is possible to
draw a comparison between the wage structure of the former GDR and the structure
established by 1997.2
In the first wave of the GSOEP-East in June 1990, about 4,000 persons in 2,000
households were interviewed. In the following waves, principally the same people
were interviewed. Sample attrition has been partly compensated for by including new
interviewees. Information on individual gross incomes and hours worked of the
previous month makes it possible to calculate hourly wages. As our analysis uses real
hourly wages, we can include short–time workers into the analysis, short–time work
having been a wide–spread instrument of employment creation especially at the
beginning of the transition process (see e.g. Licht and Steiner 1994). We also take
into account fringe benefits like holiday or Christmas pay in the calculation of hourly
wages, which constitute an increasingly important component of the wage package in
East Germany. As we are interested in market determinants of wages, only gross
wages are considered here, i.e. direct taxes and transfers are not taken into account.
The sample analysed below is restricted to employees aged between 19 and 65 years
(men) respectively 60 years (women) covered by the social security system.  Hence,
civil servants, the self-employed and those with minor employment are excluded from
the sample, as are people in education or training programs or on maternity leave.
Since we expect structural differences in the development of male and female wages
in the transition process, we split the sample by gender. The observations remaining
after the various selections are listed in Table A1 in the appendix.3
                                       
2 Details on the GSOEP can be obtained from the webserver of the German Institute of Economic
Research (DIW) in Berlin (http://www.diw-berlin.de/soep/).
3 For the analysis in this section we include all remaining observations after selections (1) – (8) in Table
A1 in the appendix.
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A particularly simple and informative way to describe changes in the wage
distribution over time is to plot various percentiles of the distribution, as we do in
Figure 1. In the following discussion, we will mainly focus on the median to represent
changes in the middle part of the distribution, the 10%–percentile to describe
changes in the lower part and the 90%–percentile in the upper part of the wage
distribution.  To see whether wage changes in other parts of the wage distribution
differ in a significant way, we also plot the 25%–percentile and the 75%-percentile.
Annual growth rates of male and female wages at the median as well as the 10%–
percentile and the 90%-percentile are plotted in the lower part of Figure 1 for the
period 1991 to 1997.
The upper part of Figure 1 shows that the wage distribution was very compressed
under socialism. In 1990, the male 90%-percentile of about DM 9.5 was less than
twice the value of the 10%-percentile and just about 1.4 times the median. Female
wages under socialism were slightly lower (the median wage of women was DM 5.7
compared to DM 6.6 for men), but the distribution of female wages was quite similar
to that of men (see Table 4).
As the lower part of Figure 1 shows, the strongest wage increases occurred in the
first year after unification, when the median nominal hourly wage increased by 45%.
Even higher wage increases occurred in the upper part of the distribution: at the 90%
percentile the male (female) wage increased by almost 65% (55%).  Compared to
these excessive wage hikes, the increases of, respectively, about 45% and 35% in the
lower part of the distribution seem almost modest.
The explanation for these astonishing differences probably is that, lacking any control
from private owners or the Treuhandanstalt, the state agency for the privatization of
the East German economy, those who were still in charge of running the state-owned
firms were in a position to grant themselves and their comrades from the socialist
system generous wage increases immediately after unification. Once the privatisation
process was well under way, wage increases declined markedly, especially in the
upper part of the wage distribution.
Judged by the growth rates of wages, we can distinguish between basically three
periods: (i) the first two years after unification saw excessive increases in nominal
wages; (ii) starting from a very high level, growth rates of nominal wages declined
sharply in the period between 1993 and 1995, and (iii) in the subsequent period
growth rates stabilised at a level of around 5 percent, on average. Furthermore, the
variance of growth rates across the wage distribution also diminished over time.
By the year 1997, this wage adjustment process has resulted in a pronounced
increase in wage inequality, as measured by percentile ratios in Table 4.  In the period
1990 to 1997, the ratio of the 90%-percentile to the 10%-percentile, which represents
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the spread of the wage distribution, increased from about 2 to 2.5 for men and from
about 2.2 to 3 for women.  Hence, overall wage inequality increased a lot more for
women than for men.  For women, wage inequality was more pronounced in the
lower part of the distribution, represented by the ratio of the median to the 10%-
percentile, than in the upper part of the distribution (ratio of the 90%-percentile to the
median).  In contrast, the increase in wage inequality for men was spread fairly evenly
across the distribution.  For both men and women, the increase in wage inequality in
the upper part of the distribution is mainly accounted for by the strong increase of
wages in the 90%-percentile, as the comparison with the 75%-percentile in the upper
part of Figure 1 shows.
Table 4: Changes in the distribution of hourly wages in East Germany and comparison with
the West German wage distribution
East Germany West Germany
Men Women Men Women
Percentile
ratio
1990 1997 1990 1997 1997 1997
90/50 1.44 1.60 1.50 1.69 1.55 1.46
50/10 1.41 1.55 1.46 1.76 1.62 1.56
90/10 2.02 2.48 2.18 2.97 2.52 2.27
Source:  GSOEP; own calculations.
It seems interesting to compare the degree of wage inequality prevailing in East
Germany at the end of the observation period with the West German level, which has
changed very little since the early eighties (Steiner and Wagner, 1997, 1998).  By
1997, overall wage inequality for East German men has reached roughly the same
level as in West Germany, both in the upper and in the lower part of the wage
distribution. In contrast, female wages in East Germany are distributed much more
unequally than in West Germany now, and this higher inequality relates both to the
lower and the upper part of the wage distribution (see Table 4).
What are the main economic factors driving changes in the distribution of hourly
wages?  Macroeconomic factors outlined in section 3 have certainly played an
important role as far as collective wage bargaining outcomes have affected
employees differently depending on sector of employment and firm size.  However, it
is unlikely that these factors can explain a large part of the widening of the wage
distribution in general, and gender differences in wage growth in particular. To
explain the observed changes in the wage distribution requires a more detailed
microeconomic analysis, to which we now turn.
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5 Human Capital and the East German Wage Structure
In contrast to its obsolete physical capital stock, East Germany is generally
considered to be well endowed with human capital.  Compared to West Germany,
the share of skilled labor, that is people with a completed apprenticeship training or
higher vocational training (“master craftsmen”), is fairly high in East Germany.  The
latter group includes both people with a vocational qualification obtained after
completed apprenticeship training and conditional on having passed a special
examination after some years of work experience in a particular trade
(“Meisterprüfung”) and people with some higher vocational training at school
(“Fachschule”).4 On the other hand, the share of unskilled labor is relatively small in
East Germany and the share of highly skilled labor (“graduates”), i.e. people with a
degree from an university or polytechnical school (“Fachhochschule”), is
comparable to the West German level.  Differences between the East and West
German skill structure for the labor force as a whole are even greater than for the
sub-population of employed people (see Table 5).5
The most interesting change in the East German skill structure concerns the decrease
in the share of unskilled employees and the concurrent increase of non-employed
people in the labor force, especially among women.  At the same time, the share of
graduates among all East German employees increased both for men and women.
By the year 1995, the share of graduates in the East German population exceeded the
West German share, and this difference was especially large for women.  On the
other hand, the share of unskilled women in the East German labor force increased
substantially, while the share of female graduates decreased perceptibly during this
period.  In contrast, the share of male graduates in the labor force increased a bit
more than their employment share, implying an increase in unemployment or non-
employment among this group.  To some extent, these gender differences can be
explained by the strong increase in female participation in public works programs,
which have been, and still are, very much concentrated on the skilled and, in
particular, women with university education (see Kraus, Puhani and Steiner, 1998).
                                       
4 In West Germany, this latter type of vocational training is much less important than it was in the former
GDR.
5 We thank our colleague Martin Falk for providing us with these calculations based on the Labor Force
Survey (Mikrozensus) for the years 1991 and 1995 held at the ZEW.
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Table 5: The skill structure of employmetn and the labor force in East and West Germany
(shares in %)
Men Women
East West a) East West a)Education/Vocational
Qualification 1991 1995 1995 1991 1995 1995
employees
unskilled 3.3 2.8 9.6 5.4 3.8 15.3
skilled 65.9 68.8 66.4 61.3 60.6 72.5
master craftsman b) 17.4 13.6 10.6 23.9 23.0 4.7
graduate 13.4 14.9 13.5 9.5 12.6 7.5
labor force
unskilled 9.7 10.3 24.6 5.3 12.0 27.1
skilled 61.3 61.0 62.3 63.1 60.6 60.5
master craftsman b) 20.8 18.4 3.9 18.6 17.7 3.7
graduate 8.3 10.3 9.2 13.0 9.6 8.6
Notes:
a) For the reason of comparison with East Germany, where the share of foreigners is very low; Figures
for West Germany only include natives; the share of unskilled labor is much higher among foreigners.
b) Master craftsman include people with higher vocational education obtained at school (“Fachschule”),
which was very common in the former GDR.
Source:  Labor Force Survey (Mikrozensus) 1991 and 1995.
Conventional wisdom holds that there was little wage differentiation by skill in the
former GDR.  However, although there is some evidence that the East German wage
structure was indeed more compressed than in West Germany (see section 4),
differentials due to educational attainment seem to have been more or less of similar
magnitude (Krueger and Pischke, 1995; Steiner and Puhani, 1997, Steiner and
Wagner, 1997).
In addition to formal qualification, labor market experience is another important
component of human capital which, in market economies, has a strong effect on
individual wages.  According to human capital theory, labor market experience is a
proxy for general human capital acquired on the job. Due to new production
processes and profound changes in the organization of work, we would expect the
value of labor market experience accumulated in the former socialist economy of the
GDR has depreciated in the transition process to a market economy.  Therefore, we
also expect rather flat experience–wage profiles when looking at the East German
wage structure after unification, an expectation which seems to be supported by
empirical evidence (Krueger and Pischke, 1992, Bird, Schwarze and Wagner, 1994,
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Steiner and Puhani, 1997, Steiner and Wagner, 1997).  However, as suggested by
Steiner and Wagner (1997), experience-wage profiles may differ between the private
and the public sector because in the latter wages are linked closely to age and, in
particular, years worked in the public sector.
According to human capital theory, firm tenure is a proxy for firm-specific human
capital investment which has a stronger effect on labor productivity and, hence,
increases wages in excess of returns to general labor market experience. In East
Germany, the effect of firm tenure on wages is likely to depend on the stage of the
transition process. In the first stage, when formerly state-owned conglomerates were
privatized on a large scale and profitable new enterprises were set up, the returns to
job mobility for the more motivated and better qualified workers were probably quite
high.  There is some evidence that this indeed can be observed and that returns to job
changing fell substantially in later periods (Hunt, 1999a).  This also suggests that in
later periods tenure effects may have been an important factor in the development of
East German wages.
Several other labor supply factors may have affected the wage structure in the East
German transition process. Since unification, employment of women has dropped
sharply and female unemployment, especially long–term unemployment, has
increased correspondingly.  On the other hand, there seems to have been little
downward–pressure on wages and only a modest decline in the female labor force
participation rate (Steiner and Kraus, 1995, Hunt 1999b). Due to their high level of
formal education and vocational training, the easy availability of child–care facilities,
but also socialist ideology supported by good career prospects and the tax system,
female labor force participation in the former GDR was one of the highest in the
world.  Since some of these factors have changed in the transition process, in
particular child–care facilities are no longer provided by firms and those provided by
communities or private institutions are either rationed or expensive (Hunt, 1997, p. 5),
we would expect only those women with a relatively high market wage remain in the
labor force.  Indeed, there seems to be some evidence that women with poor labor
market opportunities have disproportionately left the labor force and that this "self–
selection" has affected the female wage structure (Hunt 1997, 1999b).  This
conjecture is also compatible with the observed changes in the skill distribution of
women, see Table 5 above.
Early retirement has been, and still is, an important means of employment adjustment
in the first stage of the East German transition process (Licht and Steiner, 1994).  In
view of the reduction and restructuring of employment on a grand scale and the
resulting devaluation of human capital of older workers accumulated under socialism,
early retirement was seen as the easiest way to adjust the work force.  Since elderly
employees who did not take advantage of this option are most likely a very special
15
group with a high market wage, selectivity effects are also expected to important with
respect to age.
Another labor supply factor which may have affected the East German wage
structure are migrants and commuters to West Germany because they may comprise
persons with certain characteristics, which may give rise to still another selectivity–
effect. The large flows of migrants to Western Germany at the beginning of the
transition process and the persistently high number of commuters aroused much
concern among politicians and the East German public that they were loosing the
more qualified and motivated part of the workforce to West Germany.  However,
Pischke, Staat and Vögele (1994) do not find conclusive evidence for the hypothesis
that commuters are a self–selected group of employees.
6 Empirical Wage Functions
In the following empirical analysis, we try to quantify the relative importance of the
human capital factors potentially influencing the East German wage structure. For this
purpose, we estimate generalized wage functions with the logarithm of hourly wages
as the dependent variable and a number of human capital indicators related to the
discussion in the previous section. Furthermore, we examine whether potential
selection effects referred to above affect the estimated wage functions for employees.
Following the discussion in the preceding section, we proxy an individual’s human
capital by dummies for education and vocational training (unskilled, master
craftsman, and graduate, with skilled as the base category), actual labor market
experience, and firm tenure. A central implication of human capital theory is that
individual wages increase with labor market experience at a decreasing rate because
the older one gets the less profitable additional investments in human capital become
(Franz, 1999). Empirically, this should show up in concave wage–experience
profiles, which we model by including linear and quadratic experience terms in the
estimated wage functions. In order to test whether firm-tenure increases wages in
excess of labor market experience (which includes tenure) we also include a linear
and quadratic term in tenure in the wage function.  Indirectly, this also allows us to
test for the positive effect of job mobility on wages in the first phase of the East
German transition process referred to above; given the validity of this hypothesis, we
would expect a negative effect of firm tenure on individual wages.
Since it seems likely that both the returns to labor market experience and to tenure
depend on the level of vocational/educational qualification, we have included
interaction terms between these variables in the wage functions.  However, these
interactions turned out statistically insignificant in preliminary estimates of the wage
functions and were, therefore, not included in the final specification reported below.
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For the reason given above, we have also interacted the experience terms with a
dummy for public sector employment.
To account for other structural factors potentially affecting wages, we control for
firm size, industry and region in the estimation of the wage functions. To some
extent, these factors can explain wage differentials as far as collective wage
bargaining outcomes have affected individuals differently depending on sector of
employment, firm-size and, less importantly, region (see section 3). Although the
reasons for the substantial industry and firm-size effects found for most market
economies are not well understood, their empirical importance has been established
in several econometric studies (for Germany see, e.g., Gerlach and Hübler, 1995,
Möller and Bellmann, 1996).
Since we are mainly interested in structural changes in wage determination during the
transition process, the analysis is carried out for single years in order to allow the
regression coefficients to change over time. To save space, estimation results are
only reported for the years 1990, 1992, 1995 and 1997. These years also correspond
to the three different phases of the East German wage adjustment process referred to
in section 4. To allow all regression coefficients to differ by gender, the empirical
wage functions were estimated separately for males and females. Sample means of
the variables in the wage functions are described in Table A2 in the appendix.
To test for potential selection effects due to the factors mentioned in section 5, we
estimated the wage functions using the standard two–step procedure due to
Heckman (1979).6  It turned out that selectivity-effects are indeed important in the
estimation of wage functions for East Germany. Detailed estimation results of
selectivity-corrected wage functions are reported in Table 6A for men and in Table
6B for women. The following discussion focuses on the main results with respect to
the human capital variables defined above, estimation results for firm size, industry
and region effects are briefly discussed at the end of this section.
                                       
6 In the first step, the individual probability of being employed was estimated by way of cross-section
probit equations separately for men and women and for each year. In the second-step, selectivity-
corrected wage functions were estimated by OLS including the inverse Mills ratio calculated on the
basis of the first-step probit coefficients as an additional regressor.  The coefficients in the wage
functions are identified by the exclusion of various household variables (other household income,
number of children, marital status) included in the employment probit equations. For details on this
two-step procedure to correct for selectivity-bias see Heckman (1979) or Franz (1999).  Detailed
estimation results for the probit employment equations are available from the authors upon request.
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Returns to formal qualification
As mentioned above, statistical tests show that the returns to formal qualification do
not depend on labor market experience or on firm tenure, as it is the case for West
Germany (see Steiner and Wagner, 1997, 1998).  Therefore, and because of the
semi–logarithmic specification of the wage functions, the regression coefficients of
the dummy variables for qualification groups in Tables 6A and 6B,  ceteris paribus,
approximately express the wage differentials between the corresponding qualification
group and the base category (unskilled workers).7 For example, the value of the
coefficient on the dummy variable for an employee with an university degree
(graduate) for 1990 of 0.372 shown in Table 6A means that the hourly wage of male
graduates exceeded the wage of an unskilled worker with otherwise the same
characteristics by about 45% (=exp(0.372 – 1)´100).  In contrast, the wage
differential between graduates and master craftsmen was rather small, and there was
no wage differential between skilled and the small group of unskilled male workers in
the former GDR. Female wage differentials between the highly skilled and skilled
workers were even more pronounced than for men, with university graduates earning
one and a half times the hourly wage of skilled workers (Facharbeiterinnen) in the
“Workers’ and Peasants’ Republic”.  There was also a wage differential of about
15% between skilled and unskilled women in 1990.
The development of the estimated education/vocational wage differentials over time
shows some unexpected results. First, the relative wage of skilled East German men
did not increase over time; if anything, the relative wage of skilled workers declined,
although the negative coefficient in 1997 is not significantly different from zero.  For
women, the positive wage differential of skilled relative to unskilled labor has
vanished by 1995.  Second, the positive wage differential master craftsmen earned
relative to skilled laborers in 1990 has disappeared by 1997.  For women, such a
wage differential still exists, but relative to 1990 at a much lower level.  Third, both
for men and women the graduate wage differential declined perceptively during the
transition period, but substantial differentials still remain for both sexes. The graduate
wage differential for women is larger than that for men and both are comparable in
magnitude to the respective graduate wage differentials prevailing in West Germany
(see Steiner and Wagner 1997, 1998).
                                       
7 For coefficients large in absolute value, the approximation of the wage differential by the coefficient
becomes increasingly inaccurate.
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Returns to labor market experience and firm tenure
As mentioned above, returns to labor marker experience in East Germany do not
seem to depend on the level of formal qualification, as it is the case for West
Germany.  As regards the hypotheses on changes of returns to labor market
experience in the East German transition process referred to in section 5, they are
only partially supported by our estimation results.  To test these hypotheses, we
performed the following statistical tests summarized in Table 7.
Table 7: F-tests of the significance of labor market experience and tenure effects on wages
based on estimated wage-equations
Men Women
1990 1992 1995 1997 1990 1992 1995 1997
experience 0.48 3.07* 1.01  1.76 2.75 0.22  0.06  0.80
exp. ´ public sector – 3.92* 3.36*  4.81* – 6.42*  4.07*  1.17
firm tenure 4.00* 7.43* 8.60* 12.05* 6.87* 5.50* 20.72* 21.84*
Note: F-tests are based on the joint significance of the linear and quadratic term of each variable; a star
indicates that the linear and quadratic term are jointly significant at least at the 5% level.
Interaction dummies between experience and “public sector” were included in the
regressions to account for the direct dependence of wages in this sector on labor
market experience and age, respectively, due to special collective bargaining
agreements8 for this sector taken over from West Germany immediately after
unification. Table 7 shows that, with one exception, this interaction effect is always
statistically significant, which implies higher returns to labor market experience if
employed in the public sector.  Moreover, wages do not increase with general labor
market experience if not employed in the public sector.
Since labor market experience also includes tenure at the current firm, the estimated
tenure effect measures the additional return of staying an additional year with the
same firm conditional on years of labor market experience. As the F-tests in Table 7
show, tenure effects are always highly significant.
On the basis of these tests and the plots of the estimated wage-experience profiles in
the upper part of Figure 2, we draw the following conclusions.  First, the observation
                                       
8 These agreements, contained in the “Bundesangestelltentarifvertrag” (BAT), among other things
stipulate more or less automatic individual wage increases every two years of employment on top of
overall wage increases in the public sector.
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that, compared to West Germany and other market economies, returns to labor
market were very low in the former GDR is supported by the rather flat wage-
experience profiles both for men and women obtained for 1990.  Subsequently, labor
market experience was completely devalued both for men and women working in the
private sector of the economy.  However, for those keeping their job or getting a new
job in the public sector, the returns to labor market experience increased substantially
after unification.  This increase was much larger for women than for men, though.
For example, while the wage differential of a male employee with 10 (20, 30) years of
labor market experience relative to a reference person just starting work, ceteris
paribus,  increased from a meager 5 (8, 9) percent to a modest 13 (24, 33) percent
between 1990 and 1997, the respective female wage differentials increased by about
20 (35, 35) percentage points in the same period.  For women, these wage
differentials are, on average, much higher than the female experience differentials
prevailing in West Germany and are similar in magnitude to those estimated for West
German men (see Steiner and Wagner, 1997, 1998).
The share of women employed in the public sector among all East German female
employees is much higher than that for men, and this gender difference has
substantially increased over time.  According to data from the Labor Force Survey
(“Mikrozensus”), about a third of all East German women were employed in the
public sector in 1991, compared to only about 15% of all East German men.  By
1995, the share of women employed in the public sector has increased to about 43%
in East Germany, compared to about one third in West Germany. In contrast, the
share of East German men employed in the public sector has not changed during this
period; by 1995 it obtained the same level as in West Germany. To some extent, this
gender difference can be explained by the high incidence of public works programs
and publicly financed training programs among East German women with higher
education (see Kraus, Puhani and Steiner, 1997, 1999).
The pronounced upward-shift of the female wage-experience profiles in the public
sector together with the substantial increase of the share of women working in this
sector is an important factor for the observed gender differences in the development
of the East German wage distribution after unification discussed in section 4. The
public sector offered women a much better shelter against the devaluation of their
human capital acquired under socialism, because women became increasingly
employed in the public sector, at least in relative terms, where wages are
predominantly determined by formal qualification and labor market experience.  In
contrast, the share of men working in the public sector remained at a relatively low
level, and for the great majority of men employed in the private sector general human
capital acquired under socialism was devalued completely after unification.
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The plots in the lower panel of Figure 2 show that the effect of firm tenure on wages
was rather small and quite similar for men and women before unification. Given that
little job mobility existed before unification, there was little difference between the
effects of general labor market experience and firm tenure on individual wages.9 After
unification, tenure profiles became much steeper, especially for women.  For men,
returns to tenure even became negative immediately after unification, which is
compatible with the observation by Hunt (1999) referred to above that returns to job
mobility were very high in the first phase of the transition process.  For subsequent
years, however, estimated wage-tenure profiles are upward-sloping also for men, if to
a much smaller extent than for women.  This result, too, seems compatible with the
observation made by Hunt (1999) that returns to job changing fell substantially in later
periods.  However, it is not clear to us why tenure profiles differ by gender in this
respect.
Firm-size, industry and regional effects
We now turn to some other important factors, such as firm-size, industry and region,
which may have affected the East German wage structure through the German
collective bargaining system outlined in section 3.
As estimation results in Table 6A and 6B show, firm-size differentials, ceteris
paribus, seem to have been relatively small under socialism, but increased quite
substantially after unification. In 1997, large companies (more than 2,000 employees)
paid about 30% higher wages than small firms (up to 20 employees). Since this large
wage differential exists in spite of equal levels of the (observed) level of human
capital within the same economic sector, it seems likely that firm-level trade unions
and works councils, which are more prevalent in large enterprises, achieved wage
increases beyond the level set in industry-level collective bargaining agreements. This
conjecture is also supported by the persistence of comparable firm-size wage
differentials in West Germany.10
Except for a few sectors (agriculture and forestry, trade and services), industry wage
differentials were low in the former GDR.  Although significant wage differentials
have evolved in a few sectors of the East German economy wages are still rather little
differentiated by sector compared to West Germany (see e.g. Möller and Bellmann,
1995) or other developed market economies.  In East Germany, there is a relatively
large positive wage differential in banking and insurance, although only for male
employees, whereas wage differentials are strongly negative in personal services, for
                                       
9 Note the differences in scales between the upper and lower part of Figure 2.
10 Gerlach and Hübler (1995) summarise theoretical approaches to the relationship between firm size and
wages and also present an empirical analysis for West Germany.
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female employees in light industries (textiles etc.), and in trade. On the other hand,
neither in the still over-sized public sector nor in the obsolete heavy industry sector
noticeable pressure on wages has occurred. This once more shows that in sectors
with relatively powerful unions and little competition, the relative position of wages
can be held up even when the economy undergoes fundamental structural changes.
Finally, even after controlling for differences in human capital and industry structure,
wages in the former GDR differed by region, i.e. the  Länder.  Surprisingly, these
regional wage differentials were larger for women than for men, and this gender
difference also more or less persisted over time. As expected, the reunited labor
market of Berlin brought about stronger wage increases in East Berlin than in the
other East German states.  It may come as a surprise that the regional wage
differential obtains its smallest (absolute) value in the economically most backward
states of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Brandenburg, whereas it is relatively high in
the more economically prosperous states of  Thüringen and Sachsen.  However, this
could be explained by the fact that part of the regional wage differentials is already
accounted for by the industry and firm-size dummies. For example, the
comparatively low observed wage level in the state of  Mecklenburg–Vorpommern is
mainly explained by the very large negative coefficient of the dummy for the
agriculture and forestry sector, which is still predominant in this region.  Likewise, the
relatively high observed average wage in Thüringen, which is a more industrialized
state, can to some extent be explained by the firm-size effect.
7 Summary and Conclusions
Nominal wages in East Germany increased dramatically in the first years after
unification, which had very different effects on labor costs on the one hand, and the
standard of living of East Germans on the other.  While the product wage more than
doubled between 1990 and 1998, the increase in the consumption wage amounts to
some 30 percent during the same period, which is far less than it was expected by the
East German people at the eve of unification. On the one hand, the relatively slow
increase of consumption wages relative to product wages may explain the heated
disputes over “fair wage developments” in East Germany. On the other hand, unit
labor costs skyrocketed by nearly 90 percent within the first three years after the fall
of the iron curtain and have since come down only slightly still exceeding the West
German level still by a wide margin.  This resulted in a dramatic decline of
employment and extremely high unemployment rates in East Germany, which implies
that observed productivity increases do not represent real productivity gains in the
East German economy. Hence, productivity increases in East Germany would have
to be adjusted substantially in order to obtain true productivity gains  that can be
distributed to workers without causing excessive unemployment.
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We find diverse results concerning the impact of industrial structure on the
development of wages. Firm-size differentials increased quite substantially after
unification, especially in the relatively large firms. Since this large wage differential
exists in spite of equal levels of the (observed) level of human capital within the same
economic sector, it seems likely that firm-level trade unions and works councils,
which are more prevalent in large enterprises, achieved wage increases beyond the
level achieved in industry-level collective bargaining agreements.  On the other hand,
wages are still rather little differentiated by sector compared to West Germany or
other developed market economies, although significant wage differentials have
evolved in a few sectors of the East German economy.  In particular, neither in the
still over-sized public sector nor in the obsolete heavy industry sector noticeable
pressure on wages has occurred.  This shows once more that in sectors with
relatively powerful unions and little competition, the relative position of wages can be
held up even when the economy undergoes fundamental structural changes.
While East German wages increased substantially throughout the wage distribution,
there was also a pronounced increase in wage inequality. The upper ranks of the
wage distribution saw the highest increases in real wages although there were also
marked improvements for the lower ranks.  Although the wage distribution was far
from equal in the former GDR, the situation has become more critical from a purely
distribution point of view.  Over the whole period, wage inequality among women
was higher than among men. By 1997, overall wage inequality for East German men
has reached roughly the same level as in West Germany, both in the upper and in the
lower part of the wage distribution.  In contrast, female wages in East Germany are
distributed much more unequally than in West Germany now, and this higher
inequality relates both to the lower and the upper part of the wage distribution.
Substantial wage differentials between occupational groups already existed in the
former GDR: university graduates earned substantially higher wages than persons
with a vocational background, and unskilled women received the lowest wages during
socialism, too. Hence, the equality of earnings under socialism turns out to be a
myth.  After unification, the relative wage of unskilled East German men has not
increase and the positive wage differential earned by skilled relative to unskilled
women has vanished by 1995. The positive wage differential master craftsmen earned
relative to skilled laborers under socialism disappeared for men and was substantially
reduced for women. For both men and women, the graduate wage differential
declined perceptively during the transition period. The graduate wage differential for
women is still larger than that for men and both are comparable in magnitude to the
respective graduate wage differentials prevailing in West Germany.
Compared to West Germany and other market economies, wage-experience profiles
in the former GDR were rather flat and differed little by gender.  Since unification, the
human capital acquired through general work experience was completely devalued for
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both men and women working in the private sector of the East German economy.
However, for those keeping their job or getting a new job in the public sector, the
returns to labor market experience increased substantially after unification, where this
increase was much larger for women than for men.  After unification, wage profiles
became much steeper with respect to firm-tenure, especially for women.  Since these
gender-specific differences are neither related to observed variables nor potential
selection effects, it is not clear how they can be explained.
The pronounced upward-shift of the female wage-experience profile in the public
sector together with the substantial increase of the share of women working in this
sector is an important factor for the observed gender differences in the development
of the East German wage distribution after unification.  To a large extent, this also
explains the fact that the still existing wage differential between East and West
Germany has become much smaller for women than for men.  However, it seems
unlikely that the very large share of women working in the public sector, often
employed on heavily subsidized public works programs, is sustainable in the future.
In the private sector of the East German economy it will still take a long time before
wages have adjusted to West German levels.
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Figure 1
a) Percentiles of nominal hourly wages
b) Growth rates of nominal hourly wages by percentile
Source: GSOEP-East, own calculations.
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Figure 2
a) Experience profiles
b) Tenure profiles
Notes: Based on estimated wage equations in Tables 6A and 6B; labor market experience includes tenure with the current firm.
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Appendix
Table A1: Stepwise selection of samples (cases) and sample attrition (in %)
Men Women
Cases % Cases %
1990
all cases 2237 2526
(1) between 19 and 65/60 years 2012 10.06 2033 19.52
(2) employed 1885 6.31 1848 9.10
(3) not self-employed 1792 4.93 1802 2.49
(4) not marginally employed, not civil servant or military service 1767 1.40 1799 0.17
(5) not in education/full-time training, not on maternity leave 1739 1.58 1637 9.01
(6) with valid monthly earnings 1596 8.22 1510 7.76
(7) above the lower social security threshold a) 1539 3.57 1435 4.97
(8) with valid hourly wage 1528 0.71 1427 0.56
(9) with valid information on all variables b) 1514 0.92 1407 1.40
1992
all cases 2063 2323
(1) between 19 and 65/60 years 1864 9.65 1867 19.63
(2) employed 1560 16.31 1391 25.50
(3) not self-employed 1450 7.05 1345 3.31
(4) not marginally employed, not civil servant or military service 1400 3.45 1328 1.26
(5) not in education/full-time training, not on maternity leave 1353 3.47 1205 9.26
(6) with valid monthly earnings 1241 8.28 1132 6.06
(7) above the lower social security threshold a) 1236 0.40 1116 1.41
(8) with valid hourly wage 1127 8.82 1006 9.86
(9) with valid information on all variables b) 1109 1.60 992 1.39
1995
all cases 1967 2218
(1) between 19 and 65/60 years 1756 10.73 1743 21.42
(2) employed 1455 17.14 1365 21.69
(3) not self-employed 1326 8.87 1305 4.40
(4) not marginally employed, not civil servant or military service 1261 4.90 1267 2.91
(5) not in education/full-time training, not on maternity leave 1197 5.08 1098 13.34
(6) with valid monthly earnings 1123 6.18 1038 5.78
(7) above the lower social security threshold a) 1113 0.89 1018 1.93
(8) with valid hourly wage 1033 7.19 915 10.12
(9) with valid information on all variables b) 1019 1.36 904 1.20
1997
all cases 1958 2166
(1) between 19 and 65/60 years 1697 13.33 1688 22.07
(2) employed 1285 24.28 1184 29.86
(3) not self-employed 1156 10.04 1109 6.33
(4) not marginally employed, not civil servant or military service 1066 7.79 1050 5.32
(5) not in education/full-time training, not on maternity leave 1006 5.63 905 13.81
(6) with valid monthly earnings 942 6.36 858 5.19
(7) above the lower social security threshold a) 942 0.00 857 0.12
(8) with valid hourly wage 939 0.32 857 0.00
(9) with valid information on all variables b) 926 1.38 844 1.52
Notes:
a) The lower social-security threshold is 1/7 of the reference amount of monthly earnings; for the selected
years these amounts were:  1990: 200,- DM; 1992: 300,- DM; 1995: 450,- DM und 1997: 520,- DM
(Westdeutschland 1990: 470,- DM; 1992: 500,- DM; 1995: 580,- DM; 1997: 610,- DM), see
http://www.bfa-berlin.de.
b) all variables included in the estimation of the selecitivity-corrected wage equations, see section 5 in the
text.
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Table A2: Means of variables in the wage equations
Men Women
1990 1992 1995 1997 1990 1992 1995 1997
nominal hourly wages 6.961 12.984 18.232 19.625 6.076 12.162 17.659 19.235
log hourly wages 1.898 2.517 2.838 2.914 1.756 2.448 2.804 2.882
formal qualific.(unskilled)
 a)
skilled 0.667 0.703 0.696 0.688 0.636 0.589 0.577 0.583
master craftsman 0.187 0.155 0.149 0.139 0.224 0.273 0.282 0.276
graduate 0.120 0.122 0.123 0.143 0.083 0.104 0.113 0.109
labor market experience 18.170 18.819 19.142 18.422 16.469 17.000 17.251 16.506
experience squared 4.850 4.671 4.788 4.520 3.846 3.804 3.896 3.729
experience ´ public sector 2.623 3.702 3.398 3.941 5.023 7.529 8.338 8.396
exp. Sq. ´ public sector 0.686 0.968 0.908 1.060 1.071 1.610 1.889 1.960
firm tenure 13.684 9.392 7.827 7.977 11.824 8.233 7.386 8.070
tenure squared 3.056 2.069 1.573 1.492 2.298 1.541 1.312 1.369
Firm size (<20 employees)
20 – 199 0.277 0.372 0.394 0.419 0.317 0.370 0.304 0.323
200 – 1,999 0.373 0.260 0.197 0.163 0.362 0.227 0.242 0.226
³ 2000 0.280 0.172 0.128 0.146 0.209 0.187 0.170 0.169
industry (mechanical engin.)
agriculture, forestry, fishing 0.168 0.059 0.046 0.030 0.089 0.032 0.022 0.021
energy, mining 0.068 0.058 0.042 0.040 0.030 0.027 0.014 0.015
chemical products 
b) 0.067 0.070 0.055 0.061 0.055 0.035 0.036 0.028
stone,clay,glass, construction 0.114 0.161 0.265 0.248 0.038 0.028 0.042 0.043
primary and fabricated metals 0.061 0.084 0.076 0.076 0.038 0.020 0.020 0.019
textiles,apparal,food, tobacco 0.043 0.029 0.022 0.035 0.073 0.045 0.029 0.036
wholesale and retail trade 0.044 0.068 0.081 0.077 0.125 0.134 0.120 0.145
transportation 0.097 0.118 0.101 0.093 0.061 0.063 0.053 0.036
public sector  
c) 0.142 0.192 0.158 0.192 0.329 0.454 0.477 0.475
banking, insurance 0.001 0.007 0.008 0.012 0.013 0.047 0.055 0.043
business services 0.012 0.014 0.023 0.023 0.006 0.019 0.026 0.042
personal services 0.005 0.011 0.016 0.013 0.023 0.033 0.034 0.037
missing or inassignable 0.020 0.021 0.018 0.013 0.025 0.019 0.038 0.024
region (Berlin)
Mecklenburg 0.121 0.100 0.116 0.107 0.113 0.104 0.113 0.096
Brandenburg 0.154 0.165 0.165 0.172 0.155 0.150 0.151 0.144
Sachsen-Anhalt 0.190 0.199 0.183 0.172 0.192 0.204 0.182 0.201
Thueringen 0.167 0.175 0.179 0.187 0.174 0.175 0.181 0.177
Sachsen 0.309 0.292 0.299 0.312 0.301 0.276 0.295 0.306
inverse Mill’s ratio 
d) 0.119 0.191 0.203 0.336 0.224 0.323 0.301 0.434
number of observations 1,383 975 873 775 1,261 852 769 722
Notes:
a) base categories of dummy are given in parentheses ;
b) chemical products, oil products, lumber, furniture, paper, printing;
c) education, health care, welfare services, public utilities and public administration;
d) for definition see text.
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Table 6A: Selectivity-corrected cross-section wage functions for East German men a)
1990 1992 1995 1997
coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e.
constant 1.759 0.066 2.457 0.083 2.470 0.090 2.874 0.084
formal qualification (unskilled)
skilled 0.063 0.041 –0.016 0.055 0.018 0.055 –0.077 0.049
master craftsman 0.257 0.043 0.141 0.060 0.152 0.060 0.083 0.056
graduate 0.372 0.047 0.222 0.062 0.300 0.068 0.208 0.057
labor market experience (yrs.) 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.001 0.005 0.007 0.005
experience squared/100 –0.005 0.006 –0.014 0.012 –0.007 0.013 –0.021 0.012
experience ´ public sector – – 0.006 0.008 0.007 0.009 –0.005 0.008
exp. sq. ´ public sector – – –0.002 0.017 –0.003 0.021 0.029 0.020
firm tenure (yrs.) 0.004 0.002 –0.007 0.003 0.011 0.004 0.013 0.004
tenure squared/100 –0.005 0.006 0.028 0.008 –0.020 0.011 –0.025 0.011
firm size (<20 employees)
20 – 199 0.045 0.027 0.109 0.025 0.099 0.030 0.110 0.025
200 – 1,999 0.061 0.027 0.137 0.029 0.171 0.033 0.195 0.031
³ 2000 0.078 0.028 0.176 0.032 0.261 0.040 0.303 0.035
industry (mechanical engin.)
agriculture, forestry, fishing –0.247 0.023 –0.103 0.039 –0.260 0.064 –0.338 0.057
energy, mining 0.110 0.026 0.183 0.041 –0.006 0.049 0.103 0.053
chemical products etc. 
b) –0.006 0.025 0.084 0.044 –0.164 0.054 –0.067 0.051
stone, clay, glass, construction 0.023 0.023 0.190 0.032 –0.031 0.039 –0.018 0.037
primary and fabricated metals 0.044 0.024 0.040 0.039 –0.054 0.048 0.081 0.046
textiles, apparal, food, tobacco –0.090 0.032 –0.035 0.046 –0.097 0.061 –0.039 0.060
wholesale and retail trade –0.118 0.037 –0.013 0.044 –0.082 0.060 –0.098 0.049
transportation 0.008 0.027 –0.019 0.036 –0.144 0.046 –0.093 0.046
public sector 
c) 0.014 0.024 –0.097 0.073 –0.185 0.100 –0.047 0.076
banking, insurance 0.147 0.187 –0.139 0.090 –0.046 0.146 0.244 0.131
business services –0.039 0.066 0.174 0.089 –0.077 0.098 0.006 0.136
personal services 
d) –0.223 0.086 –0.097 0.098 –0.265 0.126 –0.286 0.090
missing or inassignable –0.028 0.046 0.001 0.073 –0.208 0.080 –0.051 0.104
region (East-Berlin)
Mecklenburg –0.036 0.031 –0.055 0.046 –0.167 0.054 –0.095 0.062
Brandenburg –0.054 0.028 –0.105 0.044 –0.090 0.050 –0.093 0.059
Sachsen-Anhalt –0.056 0.028 –0.093 0.042 –0.150 0.048 –0.095 0.060
Thueringen –0.029 0.029 –0.146 0.042 –0.179 0.049 –0.181 0.059
Sachsen –0.052 0.026 –0.112 0.040 –0.146 0.048 –0.150 0.057
inverse Mill’s ratio 
d) –0.152 0.052 –0.055 0.040 –0.146 0.046 –0.170 0.027
# observations 1,383 975 864 771
R2 0.399 0.263 0.295 0.431
Notes: a) s.e. = heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors;  b) chemical products, oil products, lumber,
furniture, paper, printing;  c) education, health care, welfare services, public utilities and public administration;  d)
for definition see text.
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Table 6B: Selectivity-corrected cross-section wage functions for East German women a)
1990 1992 1995 1997
coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e.
constant 1.435 0.069 2.049 0.078 2.498 0.116 2.686 0.119
formal qualification (unskilled)
skilled 0.136 0.032 0.108 0.043 0.065 0.063 0.041 0.066
master craftsman 0.427 0.034 0.288 0.046 0.204 0.068 0.214 0.071
graduate 0.544 0.042 0.480 0.054 0.347 0.075 0.357 0.078
labor market experience (yrs.) 0.006 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.007 0.006
experience squared/100 –0.016 0.007 –0.005 0.012 –0.005 0.014 –0.019 0.015
experience ´ public sector – – 0.027 0.008 0.021 0.008 0.005 0.008
exp. sq. ´ public sector – – –0.065 0.018 –0.043 0.021 –0.003 0.020
firm tenure (yrs.) 0.003 0.002 0.009 0.003 0.019 0.004 0.022 0.004
tenure squared/100 0.000 0.008 –0.024 0.010 –0.037 0.013 –0.045 0.014
firm size (<20 employees)
20 – 199 0.092 0.026 0.079 0.027 0.119 0.030 0.154 0.030
200 – 1,999 0.080 0.026 0.144 0.027 0.180 0.030 0.236 0.034
³ 2000 0.116 0.029 0.182 0.030 0.231 0.033 0.287 0.035
industry (mechanical engin.)
agriculture, forestry, fishing –0.144 0.036 –0.041 0.067 0.019 0.088 –0.239 0.109
energy, mining 0.111 0.043 0.204 0.057 0.285 0.083 0.095 0.123
chemical products etc. 
b) 0.067 0.034 0.081 0.059 –0.028 0.077 –0.143 0.085
stone, clay, glass, construction 0.091 0.036 0.150 0.073 0.125 0.089 0.004 0.082
primary and fabricated metals –0.004 0.042 –0.036 0.084 0.085 0.098 –0.048 0.092
textiles, apparal, food, tobacco –0.024 0.034 –0.059 0.058 –0.172 0.086 –0.314 0.076
wholesale and retail trade 0.027 0.031 0.047 0.050 –0.047 0.071 –0.120 0.068
transportation 0.073 0.038 0.088 0.051 0.028 0.080 –0.105 0.079
public sector 
c) 0.066 0.029 –0.077 0.075 –0.038 0.096 –0.045 0.095
banking, insurance 0.132 0.056 0.180 0.056 0.180 0.074 0.041 0.080
business services 0.155 0.063 0.245 0.068 0.152 0.095 0.047 0.084
personal services 
d) 0.042 0.053 –0.003 0.060 –0.188 0.084 –0.348 0.092
missing or inassignable –0.027 0.064 –0.056 0.062 –0.046 0.086 –0.219 0.098
region (East-Berlin)
Mecklenburg –0.037 0.035 0.018 0.037 –0.074 0.048 –0.073 0.051
Brandenburg –0.090 0.033 –0.012 0.038 –0.076 0.045 –0.141 0.047
Sachsen-Anhalt –0.092 0.032 –0.035 0.035 –0.109 0.043 –0.177 0.044
Thueringen –0.089 0.032 –0.041 0.039 –0.141 0.046 –0.167 0.045
Sachsen –0.084 0.031 –0.062 0.033 –0.127 0.040 –0.200 0.041
inverse Mill’s ratio 
d) –0.106 0.046 –0.054 0.032 –0.116 0.037 –0.105 0.035
# observations 1,261 845 758 718
R2 0.422 0.407 0.461 0.517
Notes: a) s.e. = heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors;  b) chemical products, oil products, lumber,
furniture, paper, printing;  c) education, health care, welfare services, public utilities and public administration;  d)
for definition see text.
